This paper shows that many of elliptic curve cryptosystems over quartic extension fields of odd characteristics are reduced to genus two hyperelliptic curve cryptosystems over quadratic extension fields. Moreover, it shows that almost all of the genus two hyperelliptic curve cryptosystems over quadratic extension fields of odd characteristics come under Weil descent attack. This means that many of elliptic curve cryptosystems over quartic extension fields of odd characteristics can be attacked by Weil descent uniformly.
Introduction
Now, the elliptic curve cryptosystem is one of the most important public key cryptosystems. There have been found several attack methods for elliptic curve cryptosystems, such as MOV attack [15] , Frey-Rück attack [8] , SSSA attack [19, 21, 22] , and Weil descent attack. Among them, the most problematic attack is Weil descent attack, because the class of the elliptic curves for which Weil descent attack efficiently works has not been determined yet.
Weil descent attack, of which idea was shown by Frey and Gangl [7] , aims to break DLP on algebraic curve over composite fields. For a given algebraic curve A on a composite field K, using the technique of scalar restriction, we construct an algebraic curve C on a smaller field k to cover the curve A. By doing this, we can reduce DLP on A to DLP on C. Since the definition field k of C is smaller than that K of A, Gaudry method [12] could be more effective against DLP on C than against A, provided that genus of C is small enough.
Gaudry, Hess and Smart [13] firstly showed that some of (DLP on) elliptic curve of characteristic two are really attacked by Weil descent. Later, it was shown, by Galbraith [9] and [2] , that some of hyperelliptic curve of characteristic two and some of elliptic curve of characteristic three are also attacked, respectively. Moreover Diem [6] has shown the existence of (hyper-)elliptic curves of general odd characteristics which can be attacked by Weil descent. However, elliptic or hyperelliptic curves attacked by those are very exceptional ones.
In this paper, we deal with elliptic curve cryptosystems over quartic extension fields. We show that many of those are reduced to genus two hyperelliptic curve cryptosystems over quadratic extension fields. Moreover, we show that almost all of the genus two hyperelliptic curve cryptosystems over quadratic extension fields of odd characteristics come under Weil descent attack. This means that many of elliptic curve cryptosystems over quartic extension fields of odd characteristics can be attacked by Weil descent uniformly.
The organization of the paper is as follows:
In Section 2, we show that many of elliptic curve cryptosystems over quartic extension fields are reduced to genus two hyperelliptic curve cryptosystems over quadratic extension fields. In Section 2.1, we introduce Scholten form of an elliptic curve over a quartic extension field, and we see that Scholten form is covered by a genus two hyperelliptic curve over a quadratic extension field. Then, in Section 2.2, we see that elliptic curves which can be expressed in Scholten form are ones with no two-torsions, or ones with full two-torsions.
In Section 3, we show Weil descent attack is effective in the almost all of the genus two hyperelliptic curve cryptosystems over quadratic extension field. In Section 3.1, given a genus two hyperelliptic curve over a quadratic extension, we construct an algebraic curve of genus nine over its subfield using the technique of scalar restriction. Then, in Section 3.2, we construct a C ab model of the genus nine curve, and in Section 3.3, we explicitly reduce DLP on the hyperelliptic curve to DLP on the C ab model in order to apply a variant of Gaudry method.
A Weil Descent Attack against Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems over Quartic Extension Fields
Suppose an elliptic curve defined over quartic extension field k 4 of k of odd characteristic in the Weierstrass form E w : y 2 = f (x) is given. Let k 2 be a quadratic extension of k in k 4 . Let q denote the order of k. We show that the elliptic curve E w has Scholten form [20] , that is, it has a defining equation of the form y 2 = ax 3 + bx 2 + b q 2 x + a q 2 with a, b ∈ k 4 if and only if f (x) is irreducible over k 4 with j(E) ∈ k 2 , or f (x) is completely factored over k 4 .
Moreover, we show an elliptic curve E n in Scholten form has a double cover of genus two hyperelliptic curve H : y 2 = a(x − c) 6 
6 , which is defined over k 2 (c ∈ k 4 ). Thus, we see that DLP on many of elliptic curves over quartic extension field k 4 of odd characteristics are reduced to DLP on genus two hyperelliptic curves over quadratic extension field k 2 . Here, we notice that the corresponding hyperelliptic curve has a defining equation of the form y 2 = x 6 + ax 5 + bx 4 + cx 3 + dx 2 + ex + f , not necessarily to be an imaginary type.
Scholten from
Let k = F q be a finite field of order q of characteristic different from 2. Let k d denote the d-th degree extension of k. An elliptic curve E n over k 4 is called Scholten form if it is defined by an equation
with some a, b ∈ k 4 . Scholten [20] showed that the scalar restriction Π
E n of Scholten form E n is isomorphic to Jacobian of a genus 2 hyperelliptic curve over k 2 , and gave a way to construct secure genus two hyperelliptic curve (constructive Weil descent). Moreover, he showed that an elliptic curve with full 2-torsions can be transformed into Scholten form, and observed that an elliptic curve with no 2-torsions can be also transformed experimentally.
We see in this paper that Scholten form E n on k 4 is covered by a genus two hyperelliptic curve on k 2 in a different manner from Scholten [20] , and clarify necessary and sufficient conditions for a given elliptic curve to be transformed into Scholten form.
Scholten form E n has a double cover of genus two hyperelliptic curve
Here, c denotes an element of k 4 , not included in k 2 . We notice that H is defined on k 2 . A covering map Ψ from hyperelliptic curve H to Scholten form E n is given by
(1)
For a k 4 -rational point P on Scholten form E n , let {Q 1 , Q 2 } be an inverse image of P by the covering map Ψ : H → E n . The covering map Ψ :
Here, ∞ 1 , ∞ 2 denote two points of H at infinity. By equation (1) of the covering map Ψ, we see that X-coordinates of Q 1 and Q 2 are roots of
where x(P ) denotes the x-coordinate of the point P .
We take a composition of Ψ * with trace map
Lemma 1. Let P be a k 4 -rational point of Scholten form E n . If the order of P is not less than 2q 2 + 2, then we have T · Ψ * (P ) = 0.
Proof. We only have to show that the number of P ∈ E n (k 4 ) satisfying T · Ψ * (P ) = 0 is at most 2q 2 + 1. In order to do that, it suffices to show the number of P ∈ E n (k 4 ) with
By making this monic, we have 
Since the number of such b ( = 0) are at most q 2 − 1, the number of P satisfying T · Ψ * (P ) = 0 is at most 2q 2 − 2.
By Lemma 1, we see that the homomorphism T · Ψ * from E n (k 4 ) to J H (k 2 ) is not trivial. So, it reduces DLP on E n (k 4 ) to DLP on J H (k 2 ). Thus, we know that DLP on Scholten form over k 4 is reduced to DLP on genus two hyperelliptic curve over k 2 .
Which elliptic curves are in Scholten form?
Now, we consider necessary and sufficient conditions for an elliptic curve on k 4 in Weierstrass form to be transformed into Scholten form over k 4 . In general, an isomorphism between elliptic curves (which are not necessarily in Weierstrass forms) is given by a linear transformation x → Ax + B, y → Cy + Dx + E with constants A, B, C, D. If Weierstrass form E w :
First, we consider necessary and sufficient conditions for Weierstrass form E w :
Suppose Weierstrass form E w :
Applying q 2 -Frobenius and multiplying with (δ
−q
2 ) 3 , we have 
and B ∈ k 4 satisfying γ = Aδ + B and δ
The contrary also holds:
Then, Weierstrass form E w :
Proof. Applying transformation y → y, x → x + B, we can suppose B = 0. For
Noticing that
Therefore, we have
This is transformed into
Next, for a root γ of a monic cubic irreducible polynomial f (x) over k 4 , we examine the condition of Proposition 2:
We note that d(γ) 2 )),
Proof. (⇒) Suppose d(γ) = 0. Since N k 4 |k 2 is surjective, we only need to show (γ − B)
For that sake, we see an equation for B: (4) is expanded as:
2 ) = 0.
Collecting terms of B,
Applying q 2 -Frobenius,
Equations (5) and (6) are written with matrices as
The determinant of the coefficient matrix is computed to be
This is equal to d(γ), which is not zero by assumption. Therefore,
So, we have
For this B we have
, then equation (7) has a solution B. Then, since the determinant of the coefficient matrix of equation (7) is equal to d(γ) = 0, we must have
So,
Expanding,
Adding γ q 4 -times equation (8) to equation (9),
However, the left-hand side is factored as
This implies γ ∈ k 4 , which contradicts the assumption.
From Propositions 1 and 2 and Lemma 2, we have
. The necessary and sufficient condition for Weierstrass form
Weierstrass form E w :
Next, we examine the condition d(γ) = 0.
Proof. By Lemma 3, there are some
By Lemma 2, we know
. So, to show the proposition, we only have
When the characteristic of k is not there, we can show the contrary:
Proof. We can suppose
by letting γ = γ − 1 3 T k 12 |k 4 (γ) if necessary (we notice that d(γ) remains to be zero by Lemma 2) . To show the proposition, it is sufficient to show
it is sufficient to show
By the assumption d(γ) = 0, we have (γ
Using equation (10),
and
So, by equation (11), we see γ
Summarizing foregoing arguments, for an irreducible monic cubic polynomial f (x) over k 4 and for its root γ, we have
Here, ⇐ on the last line is shown only when the characteristic of k is not three.
Remark 2. Even in the case of j(E)
∈ k 2 , we could find an elliptic curve E over k 4 with j(E ) ∈ k 2 , which is isogenious to E. Then DLP on E also reduced to DLP on a genus two hyperelliptic curve on k via DLP on E (See [10] ).
The case of f (x) being reducible over k 4
Now, we consider the case of Weierstrass form E w :
First, we consider the case of f (x) being a product of a linear polynomial and an irreducible quadratic polynomial over k 4 . For such a f (x), we assume Weierstrass form E w :
Then, (up to a scalar multiplication,) F (x) also is a product of a linear polynomial x − c and an 
From now on, in this section, we consider the case of f (x) which is completely factored over k 4 . Scholten [20] has already shown that Weierstrass form E w : y 2 = f (x) with such f (x) is always transformed into Scholten form over k 4 . Here, we show the same result in the way of Section 2.2.1, which is different from Scholten's method.
As in Section 2.2.1, we have 
Proof. By assumption, Weierstrass form E w : The contrary holds also in this case:
Proof. We can suppose B = 0 by a transformation y → y, x → x + B. Under the assumption (i) or (ii), we have 
By a transformation y → ay, x → ax, this is transformed into
to the condition (i) in Proposition 7. In such a case, A, B in the condition (i) are given by
For that sake, it is sufficient to show an equation for B
has a solution in k 4 . By equations (12), (13), we have
If we have
, then an equation (14) has a solution B ∈ k 4 . Since the determinant of the coefficient matrix of equation (14) is equal to d 2 (γ 1 , γ 2 , γ 3 ) = 0, we must have (16),
So, we have γ 1 = γ 2 or γ 2 = γ 3 or γ 3 = γ 1 which is a contradiction.
By Proposition 7, and Lemma 4,
and let
Next we consider the case of d 2 (γ 1 , γ 2 , γ 3 ) = 0 for distinct three elements γ 1 , γ 2 , γ 3 in k 4 . If the characteristic of k is not 3, we can assume γ 2 +γ 3 −2γ 1 = 0 without loss of generality. In fact, equations
Lemma 5. Suppose the characteristic of k is not 3, and γ
2 + γ 3 − 2γ 1 = 0 for distinct three elements γ 1 , γ 2 , γ 3 in k 4 . Then, if d 2 (γ 1 , γ 2 , γ 3 ) = 0
, condition (ii) in Proposition 7 holds. In such a case, A, B in condition (ii) are given by
Proof. We can suppose γ 1 = 0 by a transformation x → x + γ 1 , y → y. By assumption, we have γ 2 ± γ 3 = 0. Moreover, 
Here, we let 
Example
We take an example of an elliptic curve of Weierstrass form over a quartic extension field of prime order, and we see it is transformed into Scholten form, and see the Scholten form is covered by a genus two hyperelliptic curve over the quadratic field. We used Magma V.2.10 for computations below.
Let k be a prime field of characteristic q = p = 71, k 2 be its quadratic extension defined by an irreducible polynomial o 2 −2o+7, and k 4 be its quadratic extension defined by an irreducible polynomial r 2 − or + 
A morphism Π
2 from H 0 to E n is given by
In the computations, we take c = r.
Let F (x 0 ) denote the right-hand side of the equation for H 0 . In order to make F (x 0 ) monic, we apply a transformation Π 
with β = 3 (which makes α := F (β) = o 2756 a square) to the equation for H 0 . Then H 0 is transformed into a hyperelliptic curve H : y Here, we show Weil descent attack is effective in the almost all of the genus two hyperelliptic curve cryptosystems over quadratic extension field of odd characteristics. Given a genus two hyperelliptic curve over a quadratic extension field k 2 of order q 2 , we construct an algebraic curve of genus nine over the subfield k of order q using the technique of scalar restriction. We explicitly reduce DLP on the hyperelliptic curve to DLP on the new curve, and apply a variant [1] This means, with the result of Section 2, that Weil descent attack is effective in many of the elliptic curve cryptosystems over quartic extension fields of odd characteristics.
Weil descent of hyperelliptic curves and their GHSsections
Let H be a genus two hyperelliptic curve defined on a finite field k 2 = F q 2 which is a quadratic extension of a finite field k = F q of characteristic different from 2:
A scalar restriction Π k 2 /k H of H with respect to the extension k 2 /k is a twodimensional algebraic variety defined by the following two conjugate equations
In Weil descent attack, we should find an algebraic curve D on Π k 2 /k H, which is defined on k and is of genus as small as possible, and we reduce DLP on the hyperelliptic curve H to DLP on the curve D against which we apply Gaudry method [12] . Since the complexity of Gaudry method is O(g!) with respect to genus g, the genus of D should be less than ten or around in the usual region of security parameters.
As seen above, in Weil descent attack, the choice of the curve D on Π K/k H is critical. In the presented paper, just as in [13] and [9] , we let D be the intersection of Π k 2 /k H and a hypersurface (x :=)x 1 = x 2 , which we call 'GHSsection'. GHS-section D is an algebraic curve geometrically defined on k by equations
withF := σ(F ), both y 1 and y 2 must be zero on singular points. So, F andF contain non-trivial irreducible common factor a over k 2 . Then, sinceā is also irreducible over k 2 , we have a =ā or a andā are prime to each other. However, by assumption, we cannot have a =ā, so a andā are prime to each other. Hence, aā be a factor over k of F , which is a contradiction.
For simplicity, from now on we assume Assumption 1 F (x) does not contain any non-trivial factor over k, for hyperelliptic curve H : y 2 = F (x) to be attacked. However, even without Assumption 1, the attack remains unchanged except for the more complicated details of construction of C ab model for D.
In cases of [13] and [9] , GHS-sections D have huge genera. Remember that the complexity of Gaudry attack with respect to genus g is O(g!). So, in [13] and [9] Weil descent attack can be applied only in special cases in which we can take irreducible components of small genus of GHS-section D.
However, in our cases,
Proposition 9. The genus of GHS-section D is nine.
Proof. Under Assumption 1, as seen in the proof of Proposition 8, F (x) and F (x) are prime to each other. So, GHS-section D has twelve ramification points over H. Then, for genus g of D, by Hurwitz formula, we have 2g − 2 = 2 · (2 · 2 − 2) + 12 = 16, which means g = 9.
Therefore, we don't need to take irreducible components of D. The only thing we have to do is to construct a model over k of GHS-section D against which we can apply Gaudry attack. If we can construct such a model, DLP on H can be solved by Gaudry attack in the amount of computations O(q 
C ab model of GHS-section
In general, to construct a C ab model of a given curve D, we need to choose a point on D, which we call a "base point", and need to determine all of the regular functions outside the base point on D.
Remember that GHS-section D is defined by two equations
Since GHS-section D is a double cover of hyperelliptic curve y
-section D has four points P 1 , P 2 , P 3 and P 4 at infinity. As seen later, P 4 is fixed by the automorphism σ. We choose the point P 4 at infinity as the base point of C ab model of D. The property of P 4 being fixed by σ will be useful to construct C ab model over k.
To determine all of the regular functions outside the base point P 4 , we need to know the 'value' of a given function at points P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 at infinity. First, we find local parameter expansions of coordinate functions at those points at infinity.
Points of GHS-section at infinity
Let t := x 2 /y 1 . t is a common local parameter of hyperelliptic curve H at points Q 1 , Q 2 at infinity. Removing y 1 from the first equation of D with t, we get
This has two solutions x = −t −1 + α
1 t + · · · and
1 t + · · · , which give local parameter expansions of x at Q 1 and Q 2 , respectively. Substituting this for x of y 1 = t −1 x 2 , we get a local parameter expansion
. Moreover, substituting local parameter expansion of x at Q i for x in the second equation y
give local parameter expansions of y 2 at two points of D at infinity over Q i (i = 1, 2), respectively. Thus, we get the following local parameter expansions of points P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 on D at infinity:
The set of points at infinity {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 } is obviously invariant under the automorphism σ. Moreover, Proposition 10. P 4 is fixed by σ.
Proof. Let v P (f ) denote the valuation of a function f at point P .
Let σ(P 4 ) = P 1 . By the expansions of y 1 , y 2 at P 4 , we know v P 4 (y 1 − y 2 ) ≥ −2. On the other hand, we have v P 4 (y 1 − y 2 ) = v P 1 σ (y 1 − y 2 ) = v P 1 (y 2 − y 1 ). By the expansions y 1 , y 2 at P 1 , we see v P1 (y 2 − y 1 ) = −3, so v P4 (y 1 − y 2 ) = −3, which is a contradiction. Similarly, we know σ(P 4 ) = P 3 .
Let σ(P 4 ) = P 2 . By the expansion of x at P 4 , we have v
Thus, σ(P 4 ) = P 4 .
Regular functions outside the base point
We have to determine regular functions outside the base point P 4 on GHSsection D. Those functions are regular in x − y 1 − y 2 affine space. So, they are expressed by polynomials on x, y 1 and y 2 since D is nonsingular in the affine space by Assumption 1.
Since GHS-section D is of genus nine by Proposition 9, assuming P 4 is not a Weierstrass point of D, the minimum generators of pole numbers at P 4 is {10, 11, . . . , 19}. So, polynomials f 10 , f 11 , . . . , f 19 , which has the unique pole of order 10, 11, . . . , 19 at P 4 , respectively, generate the algebra of regular functions outside P 4 . (Even if P 4 is a Weierstrass point, the situation is similar except for members of the minimum generators of pole numbers at P 4 .)
In order to construct such a polynomial f i regular away P 4 , we recursively take a suitable linear sum of polynomials which have the same pole order at P i , until we get a polynomial regular at P i for i = 1, 2, 3. Notice we can know the 'value' of polynomials at P i using local parameter expansions of P i in Section 3.2.1.
Using those polynomials f 10 , f 11 , . . . , f 19 , we can construct an explicit C 10,11,··· ,19 model with a base point P 4 of GHS-section D over k 2 [16] . To construct an C 10,11,··· ,19 model C over k, instead of k 2 , it is sufficient to use g i = Tr k2/k (f i ) (i = 10, 11, . . . , 19) instead of f i . Here, Tr k 2 /k is defined as
We notice that g i is regular away P 4 and the pole order of g i at P 4 remains to be i by Proposition 10.
Reduction
In Section 3.2, we construct C 10,11,...,19 model C over k 2 and k of GHS-section D: g 10 , g 11 , . . . , g 19 ).
Let the isomorphism from C 10,11,...,19 model C to GHS-section D, corresponding to φ * , be
Let π be a projection from GHS-section D to hyperelliptic curve H:
The composition Π 1 := π · φ is a map from C to H.
As in Section 2, we suppose hyperelliptic curve H is a double-cover of an elliptic curve E on k 4 with a map Π 2 :
Let Π = Π 2 · Π 1 : C → E, which induces a morphism Ψ between Jacobians:
Proposition 11. Let G be an element of E(k 4 ) of prime order n, which is larger enough than the degree of Π * . Moreover, suppose n 2 does not divide the order of Jacobian Jac k 4 (C). Then, G does not vanish under Ψ.
Proof. Since the order n of G is large enough, G does not vanish under Π * . By the theory of Weil descent, there is a surjection from Jac k (C) to E(k 4 ). So, there is an element of order n in Jac k (C). Then, by the assumption that n 2 does not divide the order of Jacobian Jac k4 (C), Π * (G) must belong to Jac k (C), as pointed out by Galbraith, and Smart [11] in a more general situation. So it does not vanish under Norm k 4 /k .
By Proposition 11, we can suppose DLP on an elliptic curve E on k 4 is reduced to DLP on C 10,11,...,19 curve C on k by homomorphism Ψ. Details of the way to compute homomorphism Ψ are illustrated through examples.
Examples
We show examples which shows DLP on elliptic curves on a quartic extension field k 4 is reduced to DLP on C 10,11,...,19 curves on the subfield k. In the computations below, we used Magma V.2.10.
Example 1
Let k be a prime field of characteristic q = p = 71, k 2 be its quadratic extension defined by an irreducible polynomial o 2 −2o+7, and k 4 be its quadratic extension defined by an irreducible polynomial r 2 − or + 1. We have seen in Section 2.3 that an elliptic curve E w : v 2 1 + 70u
, which has a prime order n = 25404727, is covered by a genus two hyperelliptic curve H : y
2 : H → E w . As in Section 3.2.1, We take GHS-section D of the scalar restriction Π k 2 /k H of H. Parameter expansions with respect to t = x 2 /y 1 of points P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 at infinity on D are computed as follows: 19 ] be a coordinate ring of C. J is an ideal of R. J := π * (J) is nothing but an ideal generated by J in R 1 . J corresponds to a divisor with poles of the first order at P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , and at P 4 . We make those poles at P 1 , P 2 , P 3 vanish by taking the product of J with a polynomial with zeros at P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , e.g. h 13 := 40g 13 + 7g 12 + 44g 11 + 12g 10 + 31. Then an image of h 13 J (which is in the same ideal class of J) under φ * can be computed using an elimination ideal as follows: where Eliminate(·, {x, y 1 , y 2 }) denotes an ideal in R 2 obtained by eliminating the variables x, y 1 , y 2 from the ideal of the first argument, which shows relations among g i (i = 10, 11, . . . , 19) over J, that is the image of J by Π * 1 . Reduce(J) reduces an ideal J (for details, see [4] ).
Finally, we compute Norm k 4 /k (J):
J ← jSum(jSum(J,J), jSum(J,J)),
where jSum(J,J) denotes a sum of J and its conjugateJ over k in Jacobian of C. For details of Reduce and jSum, see [4] . Thus, we have computed J = Ψ(G) = Norm of Jacobian of C. We verified that m-times element of J is actually equal to J m in Jacobian of C. Thus, we verified that DLP on elliptic curve E w on k 4 is actually reduced to DLP on C 10,11,...,19 curve C on k.
Example 2
We show an example of group of 160-bit order.
Let k be the prime field of characteristic q = p = 2 40 − 2 35 − 1, k 2 be its quadratic extension defined by an irreducible polynomial o 2 + 352619714346, and k 4 be its quadratic extension defined by an irreducible polynomial r 2 + 702753204573o + 465976829831.
An elliptic curve of Jacobian of C. We verified that discrete-log is preserved from G to J.
Conclusion
This paper showed that Weil descent attack is effective uniformly in many of elliptic curves on quartic fields of odd characteristic or hyperelliptic curves on quadratic fields of odd characteristic. However, our attack is estimated to be effective with groups of around 210 bits or longer. To attack (hyper-)elliptic curve cryptosystems with 160-bit group in the real world, we need some works to make the method more efficient.
